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INTRODUCTION
2011 was a good year for marriage equality in the United States.
President Obama publicly renounced the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) and determined that the Department of Justice
would refuse to defend it in court.1 This determination was made despite
the DOJ’s “longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-
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Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, 2006–Present; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 2004; M.A., Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 2001; B.A.,
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 2001. © 2012, Elizabeth M. Glazer. Sincere thanks to
Mary Anne Case, Sara Feldschreiber, Dasi Ginnis, Carl Hill-Popper, Ian Robertson Kibbe, Jessie
Mansbacher, Ashira Ostrow, Nadia Sawicki, Kim Yuracko, and the members of UnredaKted for
helpful suggestions for this Essay, and to Erin Smith Dennis for inviting this Essay to lead this
symposium issue and for outstanding editorial suggestions.
1 Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. to The Honorable John A. Boehner, Speaker,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Feb.
23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (reporting that the President had
determined that Section 3 of DOMA, “as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married
under state law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment,” and that the
Attorney General would no longer instruct Department of Justice attorneys to defend it in pending
cases).
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enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their defense.”2
The DOJ concluded that there were no such reasonable arguments, making
“[t]his . . . the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the defense of
this statute.”3 The President’s “manifest . . . conclu[sion] that the statute
[wa]s unconstitutional” made even easier the DOJ’s determination to forgo
DOMA’s defense.4
The legalization of same-sex marriage in New York presented a huge
victory in 2011 for marriage equality not only federally but also at the state
level.5 The recognition of same-sex marriage in New York—which now
means that same-sex marriage is legal in nine states and in the District of
Columbia6—was a particularly notable victory in the fight for marriage

2

Id.
Id.
4
Id. (quoting Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2001)).
5
See Michael Barbaro, After Long Wait, Same-Sex Couples Marry in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/nyregion/after-long-wait-same-sexcouples-marry-in-new-york.html (describing people’s activities on the first day on which samesex couples could legally marry in New York, following the June 2011 passage of same-sex
marriage legislation).
For the text of New York’s Marriage Equality Act, see
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/marriageequalitybill.pdf.
6 Same-sex marriage is legally recognized in California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont, as well as in Washington, D.C. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating California’s
Proposition 8 and asserting that “the right to marry protects an individual’s choice of marital
partner regardless of gender”). This case was subsequently renamed Perry v. Brown, and was
recently decided by the Ninth Circuit. Perry v. Schwarzenegger Becomes Perry v. Brown, PROP 8
ON TRIAL (Sept. 5, 2011, 9:55 PM), http://prop8.berkeleylawblogs.org/2011/09/05/perry-vschwarzenegger-becomes-perry-v-brown/ (noting the case’s new name on appeal). See also
Robert Barnes, California Proposition 8 Same-Sex Marriage Ban Ruled Unconstitutional, WASH.
POST, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-same-sex-marriage-ban-ruledunconstitutional/2012/02/07/gIQAMNwkwQ_story.html?hpid=z1 (reporting that the Ninth
Circuit held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 2008) (holding that state statutory prohibition against same-sex
marriage impermissibly discriminated against gay people on account of their sexual orientation,
in violation of Connecticut’s constitution); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009)
(holding a provision of the Iowa Code prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause of Iowa’s constitution); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating Massachusetts law prohibiting same-sex couples
from “the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage”); Abby Goodnough, New
Hampshire
Legalizes
Same-Sex
Marriage,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jun.
3,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04marriage.html (“The New Hampshire legislature [and
Governor] approved revisions to a same-sex marriage bill . . . making the state the sixth to let gay
couples wed.”); Nikita Stewart & Tim Craig, D.C. Council Votes to Recognize Gay Nuptials
Elsewhere, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1 (“[Y]esterday . . . Vermont became the fourth state
to recognize same-sex marriages . . . .”); Ian Urbina, Gay Marriage Is Legal in U.S. Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/us/04marriage.html (reporting on
D.C.’s legalization of same-sex marriage, and the law’s having “survived Congressional attempts
to block it”). Though this Essay focuses on marriage developments from 2011, in 2012 the states
of Washington and Maryland legalized same-sex marriage. See Ryan Watkins, Washington
Becomes Seventh State to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, THE GA VOICE (Feb. 13, 2012,
13:27),
http://www.thegavoice.com/news/national-news/4179-washington-becomes-seventhstate-to-recognize-same-sex-marriages; Ian Duncan, Maryland Governor Signs Same-Sex
Marriage Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/01/news/la-pnmaryland-gay-marriage-law-signed-20120301.
3
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equality because New York’s same-sex marriage statute was the first samesex marriage statute that passed with a Republican-led legislative chamber.7
Moreover, New York’s recognition of same-sex marriage reportedly caused
the number of Americans living in a state recognizing same-sex marriage to
more than double.8
But 2011 was not only a good year for marriage equality. It was also a
good year for “civil union equality” in the U.S. In 2011, two states—
Illinois and Hawaii—enacted laws legalizing civil unions between
different-sex as well as same-sex couples.9 Civil unions, the first of which
were recognized in the U.S. in 2000 by the Vermont legislature10 in
response to the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. State,11
present same-sex couples with a system for recognizing their relationships
“with legal status and benefits substantially equivalent to marriage.”12
Though there exist other alternatives to marriage, such as domestic
partnerships, this Essay focuses only on civil unions because these
alternatives are not only marriage alternatives but marriage equivalents—
civil unions offer to couples all of the same benefits that would attend
marriage in the same state even though they have a different name.
Many have argued that civil unions are in fact not substantially
equivalent to marriages.13 Many have argued, too, that the provision of a
differently named alternative to marriage for same-sex couples is
objectionable because of its different name.14 These arguments are
7

Evan Wolfson, Freedom to Marry’s Top 10 Moments for Marriage in 2011, FREEDOM TO
MARRY (Dec. 16, 2011, 9:10 AM) http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/freedom-tomarrys-top-ten-moments-for-marriage-in-2011.
8
See id. (indicating that more than 35 million people lived in a state recognizing same-sex
marriages when New York enacted its marriage equality act).
9
See Katherine Franke, Civil Unions in Hawaii and Illinois: How’d They Get it Right?,
HUFFPOST POLITICS (Feb. 23, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherinefranke/civil-unions-in-hawaii-an_b_827132.html.
10
See 1999 VT. H.B. 847 § 3 (1999); see also Associated Press, Dean Signs Nation’s First
Civil-Union Law, TIMES UNION (Albany) at A4 (May 27, 2000) (“Gov. Howard Dean signed a
first-in-the-nation law Wednesday granting gay couples nearly all of the benefits of marriage.”).
11
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (reversing a lower court’s ruling that the denial of
marriage licenses to three same-sex couples by town clerks in Vermont did not violate the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution but leaving up to the legislature the task of
enacting into law a statute that would not violate the state constitution); see also Mark Strasser,
Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial Neutrality, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 935, 937 (2000) (“While refusing to specify what statutes the legislature had to
enact or modify in order to satisfy the requirements of the Vermont Constitution, the Baker court
made clear that the legislative package ‘must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford
all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law.’” (quoting Baker, 744
A.2d at 867)).
12
Cheryl Hanna, State Constitutional Decision-Making and Principles of Equality:
Revisiting Baker v. State and the Question of Gender in the Marriage Equality Debate, 74 ALB.
L. REV. 1683, 1683 (2011). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(a) (2009) (“Parties to a civil
union shall have all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under the law . . . as are
granted to spouses in a civil marriage.”).
13
See discussion infra Part I.B (describing some differences between benefits offered
through marriages and civil unions).
14
See, e.g., Marc Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil
Union”/“Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009) (“[T]o deploy ‘civil
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accompanied—sometimes implicitly and often explicitly—by an analogy
between the provision of civil unions for same-sex couples and the
provision of separate accommodations for Blacks.15
Of course, the provision of “separate but equal” accommodations for
those of different races is unconstitutional.16 Moreover, “the notion that
separate can never be equal is now a universally accepted principle of our
jurisprudence”17 has further fueled arguments against the provision of civil
unions. But civil union equality—under which states recognize civil
unions between same-sex and different-sex couples—may undermine this
analogy. And the 148 different-sex couples who entered into civil unions
in Illinois as of December 29, 2011 suggest that a civil union may be more
than a second-best alternative to marriage that would be unconstitutionally
“separate but equal.”18 Put another way, civil unions may not be “separate
but equal” because Whites in the Jim Crow South did not elect to use
facilities designated for Blacks.19
Like other literature that seeks to “imagine a space beyond marriage,”20
this Essay’s goal is to preserve those aspects of the LGBT rights movement
that have been obscured by recent victories in the fight for marriage
union’ and ‘marriage’ properly requires everyone involved in interactions where these names are
to be used to identify the couple as same- or different-sex. The mere fact of imposing a
nomenclature distinction is problematic.”).
15
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 64
ALB. L. REV. 853, 853 (2001) (“Some of the criticism [of Baker v. State], however, came from
liberals who assailed these moves as falling short of full equality for lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people—in essence creating a ‘separate but equal’ regime for gays.”).
16
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Louisiana statute requiring “all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in that
State, [to] provide equal but separate, accommodations for the white[] and colored races”); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine in
the field of public education).
17
Bennett Klein & Daniel Redman, From Separate to Equal: Litigating Marriage Equality
in a Civil Union State, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2009).
18
See John Culhane, No to Nuptials: Will Opposite-Sex Civil Unions Spell the End of
Traditional
Marriage,
SLATE
(Jan.
3.
2012,
1:41
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/01/are_states_that_experime
nt_with_opposite_sex_civil_unions_offering_a_way_to_opt_out_of_oppressive_ideas_about_ma
rriage_.htm.
19
See discussion infra Part I.C. Though further elaboration on this point appears later in this
Essay, it bears immediate notation that in rare instances whites did use facilities designated for
Blacks. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in TOILET:
PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211 (Harvey Molotch and Laura Noren,
eds., 2010) (describing the experience of John Howard Griffin, a white journalist who darkened
his skin so as to report his experiences living as a Black man in the South in the late 1950s, who
sought “sanctuary in a colored restroom” (quoting JOHN HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME 130
(1996)).
20
Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 235, 237 (2011); see also NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2009); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s
No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a
Path to Liberation, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 14-17, reprinted in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW 683 (3d ed. 2008); Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537
(2007).
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equality.21 By first describing civil unions in Part I, this Essay draws on
insights from the same-sex marriage debate elaborated in Part II in order to
argue ultimately in Part III that the civil union—though conceived as a
temporary solution to the problem of unequal marriage rights—should
remain as a permanent alternative to marriage that is available to all
couples regardless of their members’ sexes.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL UNIONS
Civil unions have been defined by their similarity to, or difference
from, same-sex marriage.22 As this Part demonstrates, since their
introduction civil unions have met ambivalent reactions from gay rights
advocates. Civil unions have been perceived as a compromise, regardless
of the equivalency between the benefits they provide and those provided by
marriage.23 Because civil unions have been characterized as “separate but
equal” alternatives to marriage, civil unions have largely been celebrated
only insofar as they have been deemed to be a necessary step toward the
legalization of same-sex marriage. The aim of this Essay is not to argue
that civil unions have not been a necessary step in the fight for marriage
equality. But the possibility exists—particularly in light of the recent
movement toward civil union equality—to redefine civil unions without
reference to same-sex marriage. This part lays the foundation for such a
redefinition.
A. Baker v. State and the Birth of the Civil Union
After being denied marriage licenses by their respective town clerks in
Vermont, three couples filed a lawsuit against the state of Vermont in
1997.24 After losing at the trial court level, the couples fared much better
on appeal. Though they did not win the right to marry, they convinced the
Vermont Supreme Court that “the State [wa]s constitutionally required to
extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow
from marriage under Vermont law.”25
The Baker court based its holding on the Common Benefits Clause in
Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, which is Vermont’s counterpart to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 On the basis

21

See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the
Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004,
2005 (2003) (mentioning the enactment of Vermont’s civil union as a piece of evidence of a
“growing national . . . acceptance of same-sex marriages and families”).
23
See Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case against Same-Sex Marriage, 2
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 14 (2004) (arguing that, with respect to the “‘civil unions’ compromise,”
“[m]ore is at issue . . . than legal benefits”).
24
Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
25
Id. at 867.
26
See id. at 870. The Common Benefits Clause provides, in pertinent part: “That
22
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of the Baker court’s statement that its constitution’s Article 7 required a
“‘more stringent’ reasonableness inquiry than was generally associated
with rational basis review under the federal constitution,”27 requiring
Vermont courts to engage in “case-specific analysis to ensure that any
exclusion from the general benefit and protection of the law would bear a
just and reasonable relation to the legislative goals,”28 it concluded that
refusing to provide same-sex couples with the benefits of marriage violated
Vermont’s constitutional guarantees even though it did not violate the
federal constitution.29
The “legislative goal” that the Baker court found to have motivated the
state’s licensing civil marriage “was . . . to legitimize children and provide
for their security.”30 The Baker court reasoned that because same-sex
couples were “no different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these
objectives,” and moreover, because “the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the legal protections incident to marriage expose[d] their children to
the precise risks that the State argue[d] the marriage laws [we]re designed
to secure against,” the exclusion of same-sex couples from Vermont’s
marriage laws was not rationally related to the legislative goal behind these
laws.
But the Baker court left up to the Vermont legislature the
determination of whether such common benefits and protections would be
provided to same-sex couples in Vermont through “inclusion within the
marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or
some equivalent statutory alternative.”31 In response to the court’s holding
in Baker, the Vermont legislature enacted the first civil union statute in the
U.S. in 2000.32 This statute was limited in scope to same-sex couples33 and
permitted same-sex couples to “have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive[d] from statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of
civil law, as [we]re granted to spouses in a marriage.”34
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single
person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community . . . .” VT. CONST. ch. 1,
art. 7 (quoted in Baker, 744 A.2d at 867).
27
Baker, 744 A.2d at 871.
28
Id. at 872 (citing State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 448 A.2d 791, 795 (Vt. 1982)).
29
See id. at 870 n.3 (comparing levels of scrutiny courts employ when determining laws’
constitutionality under Vermont’s Common Benefits Clause and the federal constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause).
30
Id. at 882.
31
Id.
32
See Associated Press, Dean Signs Nation’s First Civil-Union Law, TIMES UNION (Albany)
at A4 (May 27, 2000) (“Gov. Howard Dean signed a first-in-the-nation law Wednesday granting
gay couples nearly all of the benefits of marriage.”).
33
See YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 211 (2002) (discussing Vermont civil
unions); Erin Cleary, Note, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the Aftermath of Lewis v.
Harris: Should New Jersey Expand the Act to Include All Unmarried Cohabitants?, 60 RUTGERS
L. REV. 519, 523 (2008) (same); Strasser, supra note 11, at 937 (same).
34
1999 VT. H.B. 847 § 3 (1999).
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B. The “Separate but Equal” Alternative to Marriage
Vermont’s civil union law divided Vermonters who favored
relationship recognition rights for gays and lesbians from Vermonters who
did not.35 Moreover, the law’s impact was felt not only in Vermont but
across the nation.36 But even those who applauded Vermont’s legislation
as “the boldest step in an expanding movement to extend legal benefits to
gay and lesbian couples” characterized the legislation as just that—a step.37
And though gay rights advocates on the whole celebrated Vermont’s step,38
they also referred to civil unions as “separate but equal” alternatives to
marriage.39
This reserved optimism can be explained by the incrementalist theory,
advanced by scholars such as Kees Waaldijk,40 Bill Eskridge,41 and Yuval
Merin.42 Incrementalists have argued that equal marriage rights for samesex couples follow a series of smaller changes, each of which will cause the
eventual “acceptance of same-sex marriage [to] be perceived as a small
step once all the preceding steps have been achieved.”43 Though the theory
has been challenged,44 the incrementalist theory remains the “most
accepted and widely cited theory of the path to the legalization of same-sex

35
See Debra Rosenberg, State of the “Union”: A Law Allowing Gays to All but Marry Has
Divided the Pastoral State of Vermont. “It’s Like North and South,” Says One Woman,
NEWSWEEK 56 (Oct. 23, 2000).
36
See MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE 16-18 (2004) (describing the
“widespread national attention” that Vermont received for enacting its civil union statute).
37
Elizabeth Mehren, Vermont Senate Approves Civil Unions Bill, Sends it to House, L.A.
TIMES, VALLEY NEWS (Apr. 20, 2000).
38
See Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI-KENT L. REV. 379,
396 (2009) (“The creation of civil unions . . . was greeted with great joy by LGBT citizens around
the country.”) (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 43-82 (2002); Greg Johnson, Civil Union: A Reappraisal, 30 VT. L.
REV. 891, 892 (2006)).
39
See id. (describing the “‘separate but equal’ [claim] lodged by gay-rights advocates
against marriage substitutes).
40
See Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes, eds.,
2001).
41
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 38; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Essay, Comparative Law
and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 641, 647 (2000).
42
See MERIN, supra note 33.
43
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 108 (2010) (arguing
that the incrementalist theory inaccurately describes the path toward legalizing same-sex
marriage).
44
See id.; see also M.V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European
Experience in the United States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71 (2005) (arguing that the theory of
incrementalism must be supplemented with an approach that factors in “conditions for change”
that might differ from one continent to another and would therefore undermine the predictive
ability of the incrementalist theory).
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marriage.”45 As a result, the incrementalist theory might explain the
ambivalent response to civil unions among LGBT rights advocates.46
However it may be explained, this ambivalence may be warranted. In a
way, civil unions have been separate but equal.
Though many
commentators have resisted the analogy between civil union laws and
segregated schools and public services in the Jim Crow South, it is
important to remember that “in a real sense, civil union statutes, like racial
segregation laws, are discriminatory in that they are enacted for the purpose
of excluding a disfavored group from a legally privileged status available to
others.”47 One legislature even provided in its civil union bill that the
purpose of creating civil union status was to “preserv[e] the traditional,
historic nature and meaning of the institution of civil marriage.”48
And though the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Baker has been
characterized as “monumental,” “truly historic,”49 and “a milestone in the
movement to secure equal rights for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals,”50 the
effect of its holding—namely the establishment of the Vermont civil
union—is no longer valid in Vermont. When Vermont legalized same-sex
marriage in 2009, it stopped allowing couples to establish civil unions.51 In
fact, Connecticut and New Hampshire, the other two states that had enacted
civil union statutes and subsequently legalized same-sex marriages, have
also eliminated the option of entering into civil unions.52
The elimination of the option to enter into a civil union in these states
likely did not cause controversy because it occurred simultaneously with
these states’ legalization of same-sex marriage.53 Moreover, same-sex
45

Aloni, supra note 43, at 107.
See supra notes 23 and 39 and accompanying text; see also Aloni, supra note 43, at 108
(arguing that the incrementalist theory provides “a theoretical justification . . . for incremental
progress”).
47
See, e.g., Scott, supra note 20, at 543 (describing the debate about whether to embrace or
resist the analogy).
48
Mass. Senate Bill No. 1275 (2003). This proposed statute was rejected as unconstitutional
by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. See Scott, supra note 20, at 543 n.32 (citing Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E. 565 (Mass. 2004)).
49
Beth Robinson, The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont, 11
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 237, 248 (2001) (commentary by co-counsel to plaintiffs in Baker v.
State).
50
Strasser, supra note 11, at 935.
51
See State of Vermont, Legislative Counsel, Frequently Asked Questions About S.115, An
Act Relating to Civil Marriage, As Passed by the House and Senate 1
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/misc/s115faq.pdf (answering in the negative the question of whether
couples would be permitted to establish civil unions).
52
See David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and
Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115, 130-31 (2010) (concluding, in light of
experiences in Vermont, Connecticut, and New Hampshire that civil unions seem to be “merely
placeholders for [marriage] in a time of social transition”); Melissa Murray, Marriage as
Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60 (“In many cases, the introduction of marriage equality
has prompted the demise of alternative statuses and the possibility of a ‘menu’ of diverse options
for relationship recognition.”).
53
See id: see also Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO
AND CON 172 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (explaining that “marriage is society’s fundamental
institution”).
46
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couples are equally disadvantaged as compared to different-sex couples
whether they choose to enter into a marriage or a civil union. Until
DOMA’s repeal, same-sex couples that choose either relationship
recognition regime are not considered married for purposes of federal
law.54 This lack of federal recognition has been linked to more than a
thousand federal laws that apply differently on the basis of marital status.55
Some of these laws have received particular attention because they
quantifiably disadvantage same-sex couples, such as those relating to
income tax,56 social security spousal or survivor benefits, and the payment
of taxes on a spouse’s health insurance benefits.57 But the absence of
federal recognition for same-sex couples is applied equally against all
same-sex couples, whether married, in civil unions or neither..
Though the federal failure to recognize same-sex relationships may not
advantage marriages over civil unions, the interstate recognition of samesex relationships might.58 Joanna Grossman highlighted a body of case law
testing the validity of Vermont civil unions that returned mixed results.59
For example, in Rosengarten v. Downes a Connecticut trial court dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff’s petition to dissolve a civil
union entered into in Vermont, which the plaintiff brought in Connecticut
because of Vermont’s prerequisite six-month period of residency for filing
for a petition for divorce in Vermont.60 The appellate court upheld the
54
See Mark Strasser, What if DOMA Were Repealed? The Confused and Confusing
Interstate Marriage Recognition Jurisprudence, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249 (2010) (explaining
that DOMA has a clear impact on the recognition of couples for federal purposes, even though its
impact on the recognition of couples from state to state is less clear).
55
See Tiffany C. Graham, Exploring the Impact of the Marriage Amendments: Can Public
Employers Offer Domestic Partner Benefits to Their Gay and Lesbian Employees?, 17 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 83, 106 n.70 (2009) (indicating that 1,138 federal laws had been identified in
which marital status had an impact on the receipt of benefits, rights, or privileges) (citing Letter
from Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill Frist,
Majority
Leader,
U.S.
Senate
(Jan.
23,
2004),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf)).
56
See. e.g., ANTHONY C. INFANTI AND BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, EDS., Sexual Orientation
and Taxation, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2009); Samuel Brunson, Taxing
Polygamy: Married Filing Jointly (and Severally?), (draft) (explaining that the lack of federal
recognition for same-sex couples can generate “real costs”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941860; Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families
Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805, 805-06 (2008) (explaining that as a result of the lack of
federal recognition for same-sex couples that are legally recognized in some states, these couples
file joint returns at the state level but can only file as single taxpayers at the federal level).
57
See Tara Siegel Bernard, How Gay Marriage Will Change Couples’ Financial Lives, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 27, 2011), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/how-gay-marriage-willchange-couples-financial-lives/ (explaining that such same-sex couples are not eligible for social
security spousal or survivor benefits and that they do owe income taxes on their spouse’s health
insurance benefits whereas different-sex couples do not).
58
But see Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2147-48 (2005) (doubting whether
applying a label other than marriage to a same-sex relationship diminishes its right to
extraterritorial recognition).
59
See Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform
Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 484-86 (2005).
60
Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
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dismissal because “the governing statute provide[d] for jurisdiction over
matters involving ‘dissolution of marriage’ and a ‘civil union,’ even under
Vermont law, [wa]s not a ‘marriage.’”61
But Rosengarten can be
contrasted with other more favorable cases in which Vermont civil unions
have been recognized for the purpose of dissolving them.62 In addition, a
Georgia appellate court had ruled that a woman living with another woman
with whom she had entered into a civil union in Vermont had not complied
with an order specifying that visitation with her children was not permitted
while the woman was cohabiting with an adult to whom she was not legally
married, effectively refusing to recognize the validity of the civil union.63
Grossman noted that the Georgia court relied not only on the fact that a
Vermont civil union was not a “marriage” but also on the Georgia “miniDOMA” statute which explicitly refused to recognize an out-of-state samesex marriage.64
These mixed results do not offer a clear winner as between marriage
and its “separate but equal” counterpart. The difference between the two
alternatives has been characterized as “more than semantic” because the
distinction “relegate[s] same-sex couples to ‘second-class status’” by
denying them the right to marry.65 But the fact that the right to marry
should not be denied to same-sex couples does not itself indicate that samesex couples would or should choose marriage over an alternative regime,
assuming they could. After all, the history of marriage—and even the
recent history of marriage—is “one of subordinating wives both practically
and symbolically.”66 For this reason it is imaginable that an individual
might choose to enter into a civil union over a marriage, if given the
choice. Either option, it seems, “has an unattractive history.”67
C. Civil Union Equality
Of course, it was not until very recently that the choice between civil
unions and marriages existed in the U.S. for two reasons. First, as states in
the U.S. have legalized same-sex marriages, these states have stopped
allowing same-sex couples to enter into civil unions if the states had
previously recognized same-sex civil unions (or domestic partnerships, for

61

Grossman, supra note 59, at 484 (citing Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 177.
See id. at 485 (discussing cases from Massachusetts, Iowa, and Texas).
63
See id. (citing Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)).
64
See id. at 485-86 (citing Ga. Code Ann. 19-3-3.1 (2004)).
65
Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same-Sex
Marriage Cases, 15 LAW & SEX. 11, 21 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 570).
66
Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1223 (2010). Case argued that an “asymmetry of roles, duties, and
privileges [between men and women]. . . remained very much a part of the legal landscape [of
marriage]” through the 1970s. See id. at 1210-11. Though this asymmetry improved since the
nineteenth century, it improved from something to which Case analogized slavery to something to
which she analogized the law requiring animals to wear identifying collars and tags. See id.
67
Koppelman, supra note 23, at 15 (when commenting on the characterization of civil
unions as separate but equal, arguing that “[s]eparate but equal has an unattractive history”).
62
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that matter).68 Second, though different-sex civil unions have existed as
available alternatives to marriage in other countries such as France, the
Netherlands,69 New Zealand,70 the United Kingdom,71 and South Africa,72
no state in the U.S. until 2011 had recognized civil unions between
different-sex couples,73 with the exception of New Jersey’s civil union
statute’s availability to heterosexual couples in which at least one partner is
over the age of sixty-two.74
The Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, which
Governor Pat Quinn signed into law on January 31, 2011, permits same-sex
and different-sex couples to enter into civil unions, which afford those
couples “the obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded
or recognized by the state of Illinois to spouses.”75 Similarly, Hawaii’s
civil union law, known as Act 1, was signed into law by Governor Neil
Abercrombie on February 23, 2011and began recognizing same-sex and
different-sex couples who enter into civil unions on January 1, 2012.76
It is at this point too early to tell whether the provision of civil unions
to different-sex couples will “spell the end of traditional marriage.”77 But it
is similarly unclear whether the 148 different-sex couples out of the total
1,993 couples that as of December 29, 2011 had obtained civil union
licenses from the state of Illinois may “portend something big” about
people’s likely responses to having a choice between entering into a
marriage or a civil union.78 Most of them cited “personal or religious
68

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Franke, supra note 9 (explaining that “France, the Dutch, and many other non-U.S.
jurisdictions have” offered different-sex couples the option of entering into civil unions).
70
See Kenneth McK. Norrie, National Report: New Zealand, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 265, 268 (2011).
71
See Kenneth McK. Norrie, National Report: United Kingdom, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 329, 335 (2011).
72
See Macarena Saez, Why “Same” is So Different, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1, 7-8 (2011).
73
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
74
See Case, supra note 66, at 1224-25 (explaining that senior citizens who choose to enter
into civil unions or domestic partnerships—which in California were also available to such
couples—instead of marriages “tend to do so to preserve the benefits they have already accrued
from a prior traditional marriage”). For this reason, senior citizens were counseled to advocate
for the passage of a gender-neutral civil union statute in Illinois before such a statute eventually
passed. See John R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples Should
Advocate for the Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31 (2009).
75
Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Pub. Act 096-1513 (2011),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?name=0961513&GA=96&SessionId=76&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1716&GAID=10&Session=; see also
National Conferences of State Legislatures, Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, Jul.
2011,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domesticpartnership-statutes.aspx#IL.
76
S.B.
232,
2011
(Hawaii
2011),
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/bills/SB232_HD1_.pdf;
see
also
National
Conferences of State Legislatures, Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, Jul. 2011,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnershipstatutes.aspx#IL.
77
See Culhane, supra note 18.
78
See id.
69
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convictions against marriage” as the reason for choosing to enter into civil
unions as opposed to marriages.79 Some of them cited the desire to avoid
the labels of “husband,” “wife,” or “marriage.”80 And apparently only
between two and four of the couples chose to enter into civil unions as a
way to avoid the loss of benefits that would apply only to senior citizens.81
Of course, it is possible to speculate that attitudes about marriage in the
U.S will one day become like those that have for some time prevailed in
France.82 Or that a lawsuit like the one filed on February 2, 2011 by the
United Kingdom’s Equal Love Campaign—a popular campaign83 which
challenges bans against same-sex marriage as well as different-sex civil
partnerships84—would ever be filed in the U.S.85 Sixteen plaintiffs are
parties to the suit, comprising eight couples: four same-sex couples and
four different-sex couples.86 The four same-sex couples were refused
marriage licenses at register offices in Greenwich, Northampton, and
Petersfield.87 The four different-sex couples were refused civil partnerships
at register offices in Islington, Camden, Bristol, and Aldershot.88 The
letters of refusal that all eight couples received from their respective
register offices served as “the evidential basis to challenge in the European
Court of Human Rights the UK’s exclusion of gay couples from civil
marriage and its prohibition of straight civil partnerships.”89 Because
access to each of these institutions is not open to all couples, the lawsuit
alleges that both institutions discriminate.90

79

See id.
See id.
81
See id.; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82
See Molly Moore, More Longtime Couples in France Prefer L’Amour Without Marriage,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
21,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/20/AR2006112001272.html (reporting on the growing distaste for
marriage in France).
83
See FOR A SECULAR EUROPE, Dec. 19, 2011, http://secular-europecampaign.org/2011/12/eu-labour-meps-praised-for-supporting-equal-love/ (reporting that all
thirteen labour members of the European parliament have expressed their support for the Equal
Love Campaign). The campaign’s petition currently has 2.634 signatories, supposedly all living
in the U.K., and its Facebook page is “liked” by 2,825 Facebook users (at least one of whom lives
outside of the U.K.). See EQUAL LOVE, http://equallove.org.uk/petition/ (last visited February 20,
2012);
FACEBOOK,
EQUAL
LOVE,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/EqualLove/163531170333628?sk=wall (last visited February 20, 2012).
84
EQUAL LOVE, http://equallove.org.uk/about/ (last visited February 20, 2012).
85
See David Walters, Equal Love Case Filed to European Court, POLAR! MAGAZINE (Feb.
7, 2011), http://www.polarimagazine.com/news/equal-love-case-filed-european-court (“The UK
Equal Love Campaign, coordinated by human rights activist Peter Tatchell, has progressed
significantly in the last few days with the historic filing of a legal application to the European
Court of Human Rights.”).
86
See id.
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
Id. (quoting Peter Tatchell).
90
See id. (“There is strength in the fact that the Equal Love case highlights the two separate
but equal institutions of civil marriage and civil partnership as discriminatory, divisive and
exclusionary in that access to each institution is dependent upon the sexuality of the couple.”).
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II. THE OTHER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATES
The debate about legally recognizing same-sex marriage is not alone.
Though the other same-sex marriage debate predates the current debate
about same-sex marriage, the other other same-sex marriage debate is
arguably a debate that has more recently emerged. This Part elaborates
both of these other same-sex marriage debates, the first of which is a debate
about the appropriate normative priority of marriage and the second of
which is a debate about the exclusivity of same-sex couples. Taken
together, these other same-sex marriage debates suggest that the same-sex
marriage debate is arguably about neither marriage nor same-sex couples.
Ultimately insights from both of these other debates are relevant to the
LGBT rights movement, a movement that undoubtedly urges civil union
equality.
A. The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate
The debate about whether to legally recognize same-sex marriage in
the U.S. is said to have begun in earnest in 1993.91 It was then that the
Hawaii Supreme Court held in Baehr v. Lewin that denying marriage
licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional unless the state could
show a compelling reason to do so.92 Though same-sex marriage did not
last for long in Hawaii, the Baehr decision has been credited with sparking
the modern debate about legalizing same-sex marriage.93 Since Baehr and
its attendant aftermath,94 “the quest for the right to marry . . . bec[a]me the
LGBT movement’s signature issue.”95
But agreement was not always universal about the movement’s shared
goal to legalize same-sex marriage. Before the LGBT rights movement
directed its “obsessive focus” on the issue of same-sex marriage, there was
another, fundamentally different debate about same-sex marriage.96 That
debate is exemplified by the 1989 debate between recently deceased Paula
Ettelbrick,97 then legal director of Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and Tom
91
See Schacter, supra note 38, at 380 (“[T]he campaign for marriage began in earnest in
1993 . . . .”).
92
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage
Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51, 53 (1997) (discussing Baehr).
93
See Schacter, supra note 38, at 380-81 (linking the same-sex marriage movement to the
Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr).
94
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
1069-80 (2d ed., 2004) (discussing the aftermath of Baehr).
95
Schacter, supra note 38, at 380-81.
96
See Shannon Gilreath, Rebuttal, Arguing Against Arguing For Marriage, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 28, 29 (2010), http://pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=37 (criticizing
“the Gay rights movement’s current obsessive focus on marriage”).
97
See David W. Dunlap, Paula Ettelbrick, Legal Expert in Gay Rights Movement, Dies at
56, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/paula-l-ettelbricklegal-expert-in-gay-rights-movement-dies-at-56.html (“Ms. Ettelbrick was a prominent voice in
asserting that the many kinds of families created by homosexuals deserved acceptance and
protection. But her views, paradoxically, put her at odds with other lesbian and gay leaders over

138

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2012

Stoddard, then Lambda’s executive director, in Out/Look Magazine about
whether to pursue access to marriage.98 This debate emerged from the
early stages of the gay rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s.99
The other same-sex marriage debate involved an “internal resistance to
marriage advocacy” which “came from those strongly committed to gay
equality.”100 It “took place within the LGBT community” between
advocates for marriage and advocates who argued that advocacy for
marriage equality should be accompanied by advocacy for a menu of
alternative forms of relationship recognition, including but not limited to
civil unions.101 This debate was about “whether same-sex marriage was a
worthy normative priority for the LGBT movement.”102 This debate—the
“Primacy of Marriage” debate—had “largely receded” when Schacter
called attention to it in 2009, after five states had legalized same-sex
marriage in a span of six years.103
Since then the Primacy of Marriage debate seems to have experienced
a comeback. The internal resistance to marriage equality is arguably no
longer as quiet as it once was.104 For example, Shannon Gilreath argued in
2010 that marriage is “a furtherance of an alarming movement toward
assimilationist erasure of Gay identity and community.”105
The
assimilationist erasure to which Gilreath referred derives from the “homo
kinship” model or “like straight” logic that scholars such as Katherine
Franke, Nancy Levit, and Marc Spindelman have observed, where gay
rights advocates highlight the similarities between homosexuals and
heterosexuals as a strategic way to argue for gay rights.106 As I have
same-sex marriage and how much political capital should be spent in its pursuit.”).
98
See Schacter, supra note 38, at 387 (citing Gay Marriage: A Must or a Bust?, OUT/LOOK,
Fall 1989, at 9, 9-17, reprinted in RUBENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 20, at 678-88).
99
See Gilreath, supra note 96, at 30 (grounding his critique of marriage in “Gay
liberationism—much influenced by the liberationist understandings that emerged in the 1960s and
1970s, which were linked to women’s liberation and to the early Gay movement’s
acknowledgement of the importance of destroying gender conventions and disestablishing the
family”).
100
Schacter, supra note 38, at 383.
101
Id. at 392 (“[A]dvocacy for marriage equality should be paired with a more inclusive
policy that acknowledges and addresses the needs of a range of differently-configured family
forms) (citing POLIKOFF, supra note 20, at 132-33).
102
Id. at 382.
103
See id. at 382, 380, nn.7-11 (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003), In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009), Abby
Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2009, at A1) (describing the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, Connecticut,
California, Iowa, and Vermont).
104
See id. at 382-83 (“The fact that the public debate about same-sex marriage has been
framed as the true test of LGBT equality undoubtedly has been a prime force in quieting any
internal resistance to same-sex marriage.”).
105
Gilreath, supra note 96, at 30.
106
Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 21, 23 (2010) (relying on, inter alia, Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force et al., Make Change,
Not
Lawsuits,
http://www.thetaskforceactionfund.org/take_action/guides/change_not_lawsuits.pdf (last visited
Nov. 27, 2011), which urged strategic lawsuits); see also Katherine M. Franke, Essay, The
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argued elsewhere, while such a strategy may have practical merit, its use
risks leaving behind those within the LGBT rights movement who do not
look like straight people.107 Similarly, Gilreath argued that an exclusive
focus on marriage disenfranchises from the LGBT rights movement the
“non-normative Gays—those who do not acquiesce in patriarchal notions
of monogamous coupling and childrearing.”108
The Primacy of Marriage debate continued its resurgence in 2011, as
well. Franke, who wrote earlier of the homo kinship model, expressed
“some worry” in response to the New York Legislature’s decision to
legalize same-sex marriage.109 She explained that “[w]hile many in our
community have worked hard to secure the right of same-sex couples to
marry, others of us have been working equally hard to develop alternatives
to marriage.”110 And for these “others”—participants in the Primacy of
Marriage debate—domestic partnerships and civil unions “aren’t a
consolation prize made available to lesbian and gay couples because we are
barred from legally marrying” but rather vehicles through which to “order
our lives in ways that have given [gays and lesbians] greater freedom than
can be found in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage.”111 Franke argued
that by taking away these alternative vehicles and by taking away rights for
those who have elected to recognize their relationships through these
alternative vehicles, people are forced into marriage. That force was the
cause of Franke’s worry.
The conventional debate about same-sex marriage has generated other
worries, too. Gilreath worried about a potential increase in physical
violence.112 Judith Stacey worried that same-sex marriage would further
widen the gap between classes and races because “[s]ame-sex marriage,
like its heterosexual model, is disproportionately accessible to members of
the white middle class.”113 These worries, like Franke’s, are worries about
Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (expressing
concern that “the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay rights movement has now become ‘the
couple’”); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1368–75 (2005)
(explaining the success of “like straight” arguments in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
107
See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. ### (2012), at ### (arguing
that such a strategy has resulted in the exclusion from the LGBT rights movement of the interests
of bisexuals and the inclusion within the movement of only those who are “straight, but for the
fact that they’re gay”); Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sodomy and Polygamy, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 66, 76-78 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/sodomy-and-polygamy
(arguing that though such a strategy has been reasonably employed by the LGBT rights
movement, it must be understood in light of the movement’s purposes).
108
Gilreath, supra note 96, at 31.
109
See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Katherine M. Franke, Marriage is a Mixed
Blessing, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Gilreath, supra note 96, at 32-35 (“There is strong evidence that Gay relationships
mirror the violence of their heterosexual counterparts. . . . The dominant structure of sexual
inequality inherent in heterosexual relationships bleeds over into the Gay model, so that Gay
relationships reaffirm those social conditions to the detriment of the people involved.”).
113
Judith Stacey, Room for Debate, Unequal Opportunity, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 3, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/03/marriage-the-next-chapter/marriage-in-the-
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whether marriage is the thing around which debate should orbit.
B. The Other Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate
There is another set of worries left by the conventional same-sex
marriage debate. And like the set of worries just described, this second set
intensifies as same-sex marriage wins proliferate.114 Whereas the Primacy
of Marriage debate questions whether to fight for marriage, a second
alternative same-sex marriage debate questions whether to fight exclusively
for the rights of same-sex couples.115
Two points of clarification are in order about this additional debate,
hereinafter the Exclusivity of Civil Unions debate. First, this second
alternative debate is predicated upon the first; the Exclusivity of Civil
Unions debate questions whether to fight for rights other than marriage for
couples other than same-sex couples. Second, though the Exclusivity of
Civil Unions debate has not been so characterized until now, it is a debate
that has been brewing for quite some time. In 2002, Mary Anne Case
argued that:
[a]lthough Vermont is to be commended for extending as
many rights as it ha[d] to same-sex couples, by
withholding from them the opportunity to marry, it
devalues their unions both practically and symbolically.
And, by restricting marriage to male-female couples and
male-female couples to marriage, it forces women who
wish to unite with men under state law to do so in an
institution whose all too recent legal history is of
subordinating wives both practically and symbolically, an
institution Vermont . . . reserv[ed] for them alone because
of and not in spite of its “traditional” (that is, patriarchal)
significance.116
Since she wrote, Vermont has stopped reserving marriage for heterosexual
couples comprised of wives who could be subordinated by their
husbands.117 But while Vermont may have stopped “restricting marriage to
male-female couples,” it has not stopped “restricting male-female couples
to marriage.”118 To be sure, Case’s argument was one about the equality
us-unequal-opportunity.
114
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
115
At this point, even the other other same-sex marriage debate has not ventured beyond the
monogamy norm. On the connections between same-sex marriage and polygamy, see Adrienne
D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010). On their disconnections, see Glazer, Sodomy and Polygamy, supra
note 107.
116
Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 765, 788 (2002).
117
See Stewart & Craig, supra note 6.
118
See text accompanying supra note 116.
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of women, and her position was that such equality was compromised if
marriage was restricted to male-female couples or if civil unions were
restricted to same-sex couples. Because marriage’s history was that of
husbands subordinating wives, limiting it to male-female couples and
limiting civil unions to same-sex couples was a way to ensure that this
history remained a part of the institution of marriage and therefore was the
reason that Case objected to both limitations. As of 2010, when Case
revisited the issue in another article, no state had opened up civil unions to
all couples, giving further force to her argument.119
It was not until 2011 when Illinois and Hawaii made gestures toward
civil union equality and when activists in Europe began to demand it.120
Franke praised these states for doing so. In particular, she expressed hope
that the civil union regimes in these two states accomplish three goals:
(i) offer new legal security for same-sex couples who want
it, (ii) become an attractive way for different-sex couples to
formalize their partnerships as an affirmatively chosen
alternative to marriage, and (iii) provide a means by which
we might start to undermine the social hierarchy that
legitimizes married people and delegitimizes those who
organize their lives on marriage’s outside.121
For Franke, opening up civil unions to all couples regardless of their
members’ sexes was important because doing so might legitimize those
who do not wish to recognize their relationship as a “marriage” because of
the negative historical meaning of marriage or for whatever other reason.
III. A PERMANENT POSITION FOR A TEMPORARY SOLUTION
Both the Primacy of Marriage debate and the Exclusivity of Civil
Unions debate highlight important aspects of the fight for rights for LGBT
people. Thus, the fight for civil union equality is just as important as the
fight for marriage equality.
Moreover, because civil unions are
unencumbered by the tradition that attends and arguably burdens the
institution of marriage, civil unions may offer couples the ability to “order
[their] lives in ways that . . . give[ them] greater freedom than can be found
in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage.”122 For this reason civil unions
should be available to couples regardless of the sexes of their members, and
civil unions should continue to be available to all couples even after states
have legalized marriage for all couples.
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See Case, supra note 66, at 1223.
See supra notes 9, 73-90 and accompanying text.
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Franke, supra note 9.
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A. The Importance of the Other Debates
Taken together, the Primacy of Marriage debate and the Exclusivity of
Civil Unions debate question whether the same-sex marriage debate is
about either of its component parts, namely marriage or same-sex
couples.123 The desire for an anti-assimilationist LGBT rights movement
has motivated the Primacy of Marriage debate, namely the debate about
whether to fight for marriage .124 The desire for equality has motivated the
Exclusivity of Civil Unions debate, namely the debate about whether to
limit the fight for relationship recognition rights to same-sex couples.125 At
first blush these might seem like contradictory goals. They are not.
The desire to be equal may seem as though it contradicts the desire not
to assimilate. After all, being “just like everybody else” is arguably
another way of being equal to everybody else. The two alternative samesex marriage debates highlight that it is not only the liberty interest of not
being forced to assimilate that is essential for the LGBT rights movement
but also the equality interest of not being treated differently from couples
whose members are of different sexes.
Moreover, liberty and equality arguments are often intertwined.126
Though each of the other same-sex marriage debates can be characterized
as a debate motivated by a liberty or equality concern, neither debate is
exclusively about equality or exclusively about liberty. The preservation of
alternatives to marriage, articulated in the Primacy of Marriage debate,
seeks to ensure that individuals can exercise their liberty by choosing
among options for relationship recognition. But this debate assumes that
such a choice is only valuable if same-sex couples can make it. Thus,
equal marriage rights must precede the choice that the Primacy of Marriage
debate seeks to provide.
Similarly, the Exclusivity of Civil Unions debate, while largely about
equality, is also about liberty. If civil unions are unavailable to differentsex couples, then only same-sex couples have the right to exercise the
liberty of choosing among alternative relationship recognition vehicles.
And if only same-sex couples are offered such a choice, the law treats
similarly situated individuals differently and therefore unequally.127
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At this point, one might imagine, for fun but also for explicative value, Mike Myers’s
Saturday Night Live character Linda Richman beginning one of her “episodes” of “Coffee Talk
with Linda Richman” by prompting the audience to “discuss” the fact that the same-sex marriage
debate
is
about
neither
same-sex
nor
marriage.
See
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/91/91ncoffeetalk.phtml
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See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
125
See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 n.14 (2011)
(citing sources that argue that constitutional equality and liberty claims are often intertwined in
connection with the author’s ultimate argument that courts have accepted more liberty-based
claims in the wake of the nation’s “pluralism anxiety,” namely the anxiety that attends an
increasing number of groups seeking protection for their denial of civil rights).
127
Whether such unequal treatment is based upon sex or sexual orientation is unimportant
for the purpose of this Essay but it should be noted that the determination of this issue is the
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B. The Difference in Civil Unions’ Difference
Civil unions have a power within the debate about legalizing same-sex
marriage that is arguably greater than marriage itself. Conservatives such
as David Blankenhorn have supported the recognition of civil unions for
same-sex couples in order to preserve the sanctity of traditional marriage.128
But this does not mean that civil unions are only second-best, or “separate
but equal” alternatives to marriage.
Civil unions have essentially no history. Their roots can be traced only
about a decade.129 Moreover, civil unions that have been made available to
U.S. couples regardless of the sexes of their members are only about a year
old and are exceedingly rare.130 Thus, in sharp contrast to marriage civil
unions remain unencumbered by a history of exclusion and inequality.
Moreover, civil unions—though they offer couples all of the benefits of
marriage in states that provide marriage—could potentially begin to differ
from marriage in meaningful ways. Scholars such as Franke have argued
that individuals should have the right to “order [their] lives in ways that . . .
give[ them] greater freedom than can be found in the one-size-fits-all rules
of marriage,”131 but thus far it is unclear exactly what such greater freedom
would look like.
It remains unclear how individuals who elect to recognize their
relationships by a civil union might order their lives differently from those
who elect to recognize their relationships by a marriage. Though there are
certainly aspects of courts’ treatment of civil unions that could use
clarification, courts do treat civil unions like marriages in many cases.132
But civil unions are not marriages. For this reason civil unions are immune
from the argument often raised by opponents to same-sex marriage, namely
that the tradition of marriage is inconsistent with its extension to same-sex
couples.133 And though the freedom that civil unions bring with them
remains to be determined, perhaps civil unions may serve as the vehicle for
a wide range of alternative relationship structures whose legal recognition

subject of another debate. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Edward Stein, Evaluating the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001);
Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A
Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). I recently engaged with this very debate.
See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Optimizing Orientation, 100 Geo. L.J. ## (2012); Andrew Koppelman,
Sexual Disorientation, 100 Geo. L.J. ## (2012).
128
See Sharon Jayson, Blankenhorn: A Family Guy with a Cause, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://www.americanvalues.org/html/FUMA.htm
129
See discussion supra Part I.A.
130
See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
131
Franke, supra note 109.
132
See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
133
See, e.g., Kate Ericsson, Book Review, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation
and Constitutional Law, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 179, 185 (2011) (“Often, those in
opposition to same-sex marriage assert that their position defends traditional marriage . . . .”).
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seems unlikely: for example, “exploding marriages,”134 “three strikes
marriages,”135 “line marriages,”136 “renewable marriages,”137 solitary
marriages,”138 or a menu of “registered contractual relationships.”139
The legal recognition of these alternative relationship structures is now
purely fictional. That may never change. However unlikely their legal
recognition may be, alternative relationship structures seem to be the norm
rather than the exception.140 The divorce rate for first marriages in the U.S.
is 45-50 percent.141 The Current Population Survey of 2011 found that 7.6
million different-sex couples live in nonmarital arrangements.142 Thus, the
failure to recognize relationships other than marriages disadvantages most
people in the U.S. Because of the tradition and history associated with
marriage, marriages are not appropriate vehicles through which to legally
recognize nontraditional relationships. Civil unions just might be.
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See Emens, supra note 20, at 242 (describing a version of marriage that appeared in
Goethe’s Elective Affinities in which marriages would only last for a period of five years, about
which a character from the novel remarked would cause one or both parties to the marriage to
“become increasingly attentive” as the five year “explosion” date approached) (quoting Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe, Elective Affinities, in, 11 GOETHE: THE COLLECTED WORKS 139 (David
E. Wellbery ed., Judith Ryan trans., Princeton University Press 1995) (1809)).
135
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SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE (J.H.P. Pafford ed., Arden 2006)).
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See id. at 252-53 (describing the importance of solitude in marriage which in its strongest
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people to married people) (citing Sex and the City: A Woman’s Right to Shoes (HBO August 17,
2003)).
139
See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships (draft at 30) (proposing a model of “registered
contractual relationships” that would legally recognize relationships falling “in the large space
between marriage and informal cohabitation” which includes “diverse groups of couples with
different levels of commitment and varied legal needs”).
140
See id. at 6-7 (reporting that the U.S. has experienced an “extraordinary rise in the number
of unmarried couples, which has been accompanied by a decline in the number of marriages).
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Linda A. Jacobsen & Mark Mather, U.S. Economic and Social Trends Since 2000, 65
POP. BULL., 10 (Feb. 2010).
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Nov.
3,
2011,
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CONCLUSION
For nearly twenty years the movement for LGBT rights has been
largely defined by the fight for same-sex marriage. As same-sex marriage
wins thankfully proliferate, it is important to remember that the fight for
same-sex marriage is not the only fight for relationship recognition that
matters to the LGBT rights movement. This Essay has described two
alternative same-sex marriage debates, the Primacy of Marriage debate and
the Exclusivity of Civil Unions debate, which together question whether
the LGBT rights movement should limit its focus to marriage or to samesex couples. Because of the movement’s dedication to liberty as well as
equality interests, this Essay has argued for civil union equality. First, civil
unions should remain as alternatives to marriage in the U.S. even after
states legally recognize same-sex marriages. Second, civil unions should
be made available not only to same-sex couples but also to different-sex
couples.
***

